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A  critical  question  for  government  ofﬁcials,  managers  of  NGOs,  and politicians  is  how  to  respond  to
situations  in  which  large  numbers  of  lives  are  at risk.  Theories  in  judgment  and  decision  making  as  well
as economics  suggest  diminishing  marginal  utility  with  increasing  quantities  of goods.  In  the  domain
of  lifesaving,  this  form  of  non-linearity  implies  decreasing  concern  for individual  lives as  the  number  ofeywords:
alue of life
cope insensitivity
nformation processing
affected  people  increases.  In  this  paper, we  show  how  intuitive  valuations  based on  prosocial  emotions
can  lead  to scope  insensitivity  and  suboptimal  responses  to lives  at risk.  We  present  both  normative
and  descriptive  models  of valuations  of  lives  and  discuss  the  underlying  psychological  processes  as they
relate to judgments  and  decisions  made  in public  policy  and  by  NGOs.
lsevie
 artic© 2015  Published  by  E
This  is an open  access
. Introduction
People in organizations often have to make decisions that affect
he welfare of others. This includes allocations of resources (e.g.,
oney, time, and services) by national and international organi-
ations as well as by government agencies. In situations where
he welfare of large segments of a population is threatened, both
overnment and non-government organizations (e.g., charities;
GOs) are called upon to react. Recent examples of such large-scale
hreats include the ongoing humanitarian crises in Africa as well as
rmed conﬂicts (e.g., the civil war in Syria) and natural catastrophes
e.g., hurricanes and earthquakes). In response to such calami-
ies, international humanitarian aid in 2011 consisted of both
overnment-provided ($12.5 billion) and private voluntary ($4.6
illion) contributions (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013). In
rder to understand how managers, civil servants, politicians, and
ther administrators make decisions regarding the welfare of peo-
le whose lives are in danger, we need to better understand how
eople value the lives of others.
In this article we give examples of how human lives are valued
nd how this deviates from how they should be valued according
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Marketing, WU Vienna University of
conomics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria.
el.: +43 1313364522; fax: +43 131336904522.
E-mail address: stephan.dickert@wu.ac.at (S. Dickert).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.002
211-3681/© 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc on behalf of Society for Applied Research in M
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).r  Inc on  behalf  of  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.
le  under  the CC BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
to egalitarian norms. We  argue that valuations of lives are prone
to well-documented biases when done intuitively. Following dual
process models, we deﬁne intuitive information processing to be
primarily automatic and affective in nature and deliberative infor-
mation processing to be controlled and reason-based (Evans, 2008;
Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). We  ﬁrst present two
examples of valuations that follow normative moral principles,
then contrast them with descriptive valuation models resulting
from intuitive processing. Finally, we present a short study to
demonstrate how variations in elicitation methods can lead to dif-
ferent valuations of lives and close with a discussion on how these
valuations could be improved.
Experimental research has shown that valuations of lives are
often scope insensitive, which is the tendency to be relatively unre-
sponsive to the number of people at risk in large-scale humanitarian
catastrophes. Scope insensitivity can lead to suboptimal decision
outcomes in public policy. This is the case in situations where the
goal is to improve the welfare of as many people as possible, but
the decisions (and underlying valuations) do not correspond to this
goal (Baron & Szymanska, 2011). Before examining the reasons for
scope insensitivity, we brieﬂy reﬂect on some normative aspects of
valuations of life.1.1. Normative valuations of lives
How should human lives be valued? This is a complex ques-
tion whose answer depends largely on the adopted philosophical
emory and Cognition. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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auditory perception, the value of money, as well as the value of
human lives (see Fig. 3). Also known as diminishing marginal utility
among economists (e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and
2 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
3 An entirely different philosophical approach to normative valuations was sug-
gested by Taurek (1977), who  asserted that the utility of saving one life cannot be
meaningfully added to saving another life. According to this perspective, saving livesFig. 1. Linear function.
iewpoint. What is considered normative may  depend on several
ifferent criteria and goals pursued. Here we focus on two exam-
les of normative principles that can be justiﬁed with egalitarian
oral values and the goal of group survival. According to egali-
arian moral perspectives (and various forms of utilitarianism), all
ives should be valued equally (Baron & Szymanska, 2011; Dickert,
ästfjäll, Kleber, & Slovic, 2012; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). In addi-
ion to this moral principle, it is also possible to acknowledge
hat losses of lives may  sometimes be so large as to threaten the
urvivability of a population. In such cases, the value of each addi-
ional endangered life increases disproportionally (Slovic, Fischoff,
 Lichtenstein, 1982).
If all lives are inherently of equal value, one would expect policy
ecisions to be faithful to this egalitarian moral principle when-
ver possible.1 Such valuations are captured by a simple formula
n which the level of response is given by R = X × N, where R is
he aid response (measured either in ﬁnancial contributions, vol-
nteer time, volunteer numbers, etc.), X is the response for one
ictim, and N is the number of victims. The resulting linear func-
ion is depicted in Fig. 1 and shows that each additional life at risk
hould increase resource allocation to the same extent. An under-
ying assumption of this valuation function is that the efﬁciency of
ifesaving remains constant such that saving an additional life does
ot become cheaper if more lives are at risk. This assumption is
easonable in situations in which the impact of how much an addi-
ional dollar can do to save a life does not change (e.g., if the cost
nd effectiveness of an additional vaccine or a bowl of rice remains
onstant).
The second normative valuation function is illustrated in Fig. 2
nd is linear until the number of lives at risk reaches a critical
oint T at which the sustainability of the group is threatened. After
his point, the value of each additional life at risk increases expo-
entially, which can be modeled by a value function of R = X × Nb,
ith b = 1 for all N ≤ T and b > 1 for N > T. As the number of lives at
isk increases, progressively more aid is given to each one. Both
unctions can be considered normative because they represent val-
ations that are based on generally accepted moral principles (i.e.,
quality of lives and survival of the group). However, it should also
e noted that other possible normative valuation functions exist.
or example, if the goal is to save a speciﬁc number of lives in
rder to reach a critical threshold needed for the survival of a group,
1 Naturally, constraints or competing objectives may  prevent policy decisions to
lways follow such a principle.Fig. 2. Exponential function with threshold T.
valuations might increase sharply until such threshold is reached
and then level off or drop.2,3
1.2. Psychophysical numbing
Evidence exists that valuations of lives underlying aid responses
do not always follow such normative models. As the number of lives
at risk increases, people tend to exhibit valuations that become
progressively less sensitive to changes in victim numbers. This
diminished sensitivity to the value of life was  documented by
Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich (1997) by assessing
individuals’ willingness to aid groups of different sizes. In one study
that compared the effect of the size of refugee camps, participants
stated that it would be more beneﬁcial to save 4500 lives when
the size of the camp was smaller (11,000 refugees) compared to
a larger camp (250,000 refugees). This suggests that respondents
valued saving 4500 lives in the smaller camp more than saving the
same amount when more lives were at risk. If each individual life
that can be saved is valued to the same extent (as proposed by a lin-
ear valuation function), then the size of the refugee camp should not
make a difference. However, the results by Fetherstonhaugh et al.
(1997) suggest that participants were less sensitive to the number
of lives when the proportion was low (2% saved) compared to high
(41% saved).4
In accordance with similar insensitivity to changes in quantity
in the domain of perception, Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) termed
this type of valuation “psychophysical numbing”. It can be captured
by the mathematical formula of R = X × Nb, with an exponential
coefﬁcient 0 < b < 1. The diminishing sensitivity (with increasing
quantity of a stimulus) gives rise to a distinct functional form
which describes valuations of several domains, including visual andis  not a utility-maximizing problem. Instead, the way lives should be valued is to
give  each life at risk the same chance of survival, regardless of how many lives are in
danger. When given the chance to either save one or 50 people, an “equal chance”
entails ﬂipping a coin to determine who is being saved.
4 Although not normative according to a linear valuation, an exponential normat-
ive model could in theory explain these ﬁndings if participants perceived the affected
proportion of the smaller camp to be large enough to threaten the survivability of
the entire camp.
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epicted as a concave value function in prospect theory (Kahneman
 Tversky, 1979), psychophysical numbing implies that saving an
dditional life is always valued less than the previous life (for a sim-
lar argument see Andreoni, 2007). This insensitivity is at odds with
he normative models presented earlier. A valuation pattern with
ecreasing marginal utility can be appropriate for typical market
oods and is generally considered rational among utility theorists.
owever, applying the concept of diminishing marginal value in the
omain of humanitarian aid can lead to unwanted consequences.
esides valuing each additional life less than the previous life, more
eight is given to saving higher proportions rather than a higher
bsolute number of lives.
Nonetheless, evaluating the quality of humanitarian aid by the
roportion of lives saved seems to hold intuitive appeal. Research
n proportional reasoning shows that people can prefer helping a
arger proportion of victims even if this means helping a smaller
bsolute number (Bartels, 2006; Bartels & Burnett, 2011). Fur-
hermore, making people aware of this tradeoff does not seem to
hange their preferences. One reason for this “proportion domi-
ance” is related to the fact that proportions are intuitively easier to
nderstand than absolute numbers (e.g., Slovic, Finucane, Peters, &
acGregor, 2002). Indeed, proportions assert stronger inﬂuence on
aluations when the quantity to be judged is not readily evaluable
y itself (Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Hsee, 1996, 1998), as is the case for
aluations of lives (Slovic, 2007; Slovic, Zionts, Woods, Goodman, &
inks, 2013). For example, a humanitarian aid intervention program
aving 80% of lives at risk is clearly good whereas an interven-
ion program saving a speciﬁc absolute number of lives (e.g., 80)
s difﬁcult to evaluate without additional information (such as the
roup size of all that are affected or the number of lives saved by
nother intervention program). Proportions carry inherent affec-
ive meaning that informs valuations but they can give rise to scope
nsensitivity when large changes in proportions are needed to sub-
ectively feel the difference and take action.
.3. Psychic numbing and the role of emotions in scope
nsensitivity
Psychophysical numbing describes the lack of scaling of human-
tarian responses with respect to an increasing number of lives at
isk. However, it cannot explain situations in which people fail to
espond entirely. This can be the case when people are confronted
ith humanitarian crises that affect large groups of victims (e.g.,
enocides, wars, or famines). An example is the genocide in Darfur,
hich has evoked little public concern. This is especially problem-
tic on the level of government institutions and non-governmentFig. 4. Psychic numbing function.
organizations. However, these seemingly uncaring responses are
also evident in judgments and decisions made by individuals.
Given the great extent that humans are capable of caring for
individual lives, it is surprising that one should remain passive
and silent when large numbers of lives are threatened. It seems
as though people are not able to multiply the caring they feel for
one individual by the number of people at risk (Slovic, 2010). In fact,
being confronted with too much suffering can lead to the collapse
of compassion, which is responsible for the inactivity in the face of
large catastrophes. To model this breakdown of compassion, Slovic
(2007) has proposed a “psychic numbing” function, which is pre-
sented in Fig. 4. It follows a functional form similar to an inverse
exponential function R = X × N−b, with 0 < b < 1. According to this
valuation model, humanitarian aid responses are largest when only
few lives are at risk and decrease as the number increases. This valu-
ation model was developed to describe emotional reactions toward
people in need, however since people’s willingness to help is often
based on emotions it can also reﬂect aid responses.
To understand why and when compassion collapses in the face
of large victim numbers, it is helpful to look at how pro-social emo-
tions are generated as well as regulated. Ample evidence exists
that emotions like sympathy and compassion are stronger when
it is easy to visually attend to or mentally imagine the victims. For
example, presenting victims alone rather than as part of a larger
group usually creates more pro-social emotions (Dickert & Slovic,
2009; Dickert, Kleber, Peters, & Slovic, 2011; Dickert, Sagara, &
Slovic, 2011; Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic & Västfjäll, 2010;
Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). This is especially the case
when the focus is on identiﬁed single victims versus large groups
of victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a,b, 2007; Slovic, 2007). Neuro-
scientiﬁc evidence shows that the emotional reward center of
the brain, the striatum, was more activated for identiﬁed victims
(compared to non-identiﬁed victims), and further, that this acti-
vation predicted how much participants were willing to donate
(Genevsky, Västfjäll, Slovic, & Knutson, 2013). Also, when victims
are perceived as a coherent unit (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996;
Smith, Faro, & Burson, 2013) and physically or psychologically close
(Batson, 1990; Loewenstein & Small, 2007) usually prosocial emo-
tions are stronger. Sympathy is also easier to evoke through sudden
changes (compared to long-lasting effects) in the wellbeing of oth-
ers (Small, 2010). Together, this evidence suggests that contextual
information enhances the generation of prosocial emotions when
this information highlights the pressing need of a few identiﬁed
victims.
In situations where many people need help, prosocial emo-
tions may  not be sufﬁciently generated in the ﬁrst place or
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egulated down to reduce empathic overload (Cameron & Payne,
011; Rubaltelli & Agnoli, 2012). Some evidence exists that other,
ometimes highly pertinent information has similar deleterious
ffects on the generation of pro-social emotions and valuations
f individual lives. For example, presenting information in the
orm of background statistics about the numbers of lives at
isk can decrease people’s willingness to contribute to chari-
able causes. Small et al. (2007) presented an identiﬁed single
ictim together with background statistics about a general human-
tarian aid crisis and found that ﬁnancial contributions to the
ingle victim decreased compared to when the victim was pre-
ented without statistics. These authors argue that information
bout identiﬁed single victims is processed affectively whereas
dding non-affective information such as background statistics
eads to stronger deliberative processing that reduces sympathetic
esponses. These examples also show that the effects of emotional
aluations are not always ideal. Emotions direct attention to what is
onsidered the most pressing need, but they may  also create scope
nsensitivity. Too much or too little emotional involvement can lead
o failure to react as well as compassion collapse.5
It is quite possible that valuations ascribed to the identiﬁed and
ingle victim effects are also related to the perceived efﬁcacy of
otential donors. Some evidence suggests that proportion dom-
nance in charitable giving is mediated by the perceived utility
f a donation (Erlandsson, Björklund, & Bäckström, 2013). Appar-
ntly, saving a higher percentage of lives is sometimes seen as more
seful. As donors do like to feel that their donation makes a differ-
nce, describing general humanitarian aid projects in more detail
ed to an increased willingness to donate in Cryder, Loewenstein,
nd Scheines (2013). Conversely, situations in which the perceived
fﬁcacy of a donation is undermined by contextual information sug-
esting that helping responses are likely to be fruitless decrease
aring and prosocial action. Research has shown that information
bout other victims (i.e., the number of victims that cannot be
elped) can create a state of pseudo-inefﬁcacy which demotivates
elping (Västfjäll, Slovic, & Mayorga, submitted for publication).
seudo-inefﬁcacy and compassion collapse can explain why  and
hen valuations become scope insensitive and follow a psychic
umbing function. In a recent study, participants’ compassion
oward children in need decreased as soon as more than one child
as in danger (Västfjäll, Slovic, Mayorga, & Peters, 2014). This is in
ine with the notion that both emotional reactions and perceived
fﬁcacy are greatest when only few lives are at risk, which can lead
o an intuitive preference for lifesaving interventions that beneﬁt
maller groups of affected people.
.4. Valuation preferences
We  conducted a small study to examine if people have system-
tic preferences for speciﬁc valuation functions and whether this
epends on how the valuation preferences are elicited. The study
as not designed to test which valuation function is best in all
inds of situations and under all possible circumstances. It was
esigned to provide a simple example of how stated preferences
or valuations can be disconnected from actual choice behavior
n lifesaving contexts. As the nature of normative and descriptive
aluation models is of special interest for public policy decisions,
e wanted to see whether preferences of individual people can
e reversed depending on the elicitation method (Lichtenstein &
lovic, 2006). Speciﬁcally, we aimed to test (1) whether speciﬁc
aluation functions are preferred over others when using ratings as
licitation method, (2) which function people would choose, and (3)
5 See Grant and Schwartz (2011) for a similar argument on various psychological
onstructs that follow a non-monotonic inverted-U shape.emory and Cognition 4 (2015) 248–255 251
which valuation function best describes actual allocations by NGOs
and government agencies. Finally, we  gave participants a choice
scenario in which they could choose to save a higher proportion
of victims versus a larger number of victims to see whether their
revealed preferences would match their stated preferences.
In the study, we  asked participants (n = 41; Mage = 22.9; 68%
female) recruited from the University of Vienna to imagine working
for a charitable organization and being responsible for the alloca-
tion of funds in an African village facing a severe food shortage.
Participants were told that they could distribute a maximum of
5000 donated Euros and that 100 people live in the village. The
distribution of donations can follow one of three different plans
(Programs A–C). In a within-subjects design, we then presented
three different valuation models to all participants which depicted
functions similar to those presented in Fig. 1 (Program A: linear val-
uations), 3 (Program B: psychophysical numbing), and 4 (Program
C: psychic numbing). The details of each valuation function were
explained under the ﬁgures (e.g., valuations increase at a constant
rate in Fig. 1, increase at a decreasing rate in Fig. 3, and decrease in
Fig. 4; for details see Appendix A). For each function, participants
rated how much they agreed that the donation money should gen-
erally be distributed as depicted in the ﬁgures (on a scale from
1 = do not agree at all to 7 = agree very much), which we inter-
preted as their “normative preferences”. Next we asked participants
to choose one of these functions as their preferred option to dis-
tribute the donation money, which we interpreted as their stated
“subjective preference”. After that, participants judged how dona-
tions are actually allocated in such a context, which we  interpret as
“judged allocations”. Finally, we  presented the same participants
with a different decision scenario unrelated to the ﬁrst in which
they were asked to choose between two charitable programs pro-
viding food to people in need. “Project A” provided food for 102
out of 115 people at risk of starvation, whereas “Project B” pro-
vided food for 105 out of 247 people at risk of starvation. This
task followed the typical format of proportion dominance studies
(e.g., Bartels, 2006; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997), and assumes that
the cost for both programs is the same. A linear valuation function
should favor Project B, since saving 105 lives is better than saving
102.
A repeated measured analysis of variance showed that partic-
ipants’ normative preferences differed signiﬁcantly between the
valuation functions F(2,80) = 46.3, p < .001, 2p = .537. As can be seen
in Fig. 5, preferences were higher for the linear function com-
pared to the psychophysical and psychic numbing functions. Also,
to indicate their subjective preference participants chose the linear
function signiﬁcantly more often than the psychophysical func-
tion, X2 (1, N = 41) = 10.8, p = .001 (and no one chose the psychic
numbing function; see Fig. 6). When asked which function best
describes actual allocations by NGOs, participants’ choices were
also not equally distributed, X2 (2, N = 40) = 5.2, p = .076. Speciﬁcally,
in this case most participants selected the psychophysical func-
tion. Lastly, the results of the second choice scenario between the
two charitable projects indicated that most participants preferred
the project which saved the higher proportion, X2 (1, N = 36) = 4.0,
p = .045 (see Fig. 7), which is consistent with the psychophysical
function.
These results suggest that, on average, although participants
prefer a linear valuation function when asked about their normat-
ive and subjective preferences, they do not necessarily apply these
preferences when given a choice scenario in which saving a higher
proportion is pitted against saving a higher number of victims. This
proportional response is consistent with psychophysical numbing
and is likely driven by the intuitive appeal of proportion dominance
(i.e., helping a larger proportion feels better) and the relative insen-
sitivity of saving 105 versus 102 lives. The results of our small study
serve as a demonstration of how stated preferences are not always
252 S. Dickert et al. / Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 248–255
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onnected to choices in lifesaving contexts, even when being aware
f the different valuation functions. In situations where more lives
nd more money are at play, a divergence between valuations and
hoices could fail to accomplish the goal of saving as many peo-
le as possible. One of the questions that research needs to answer
egarding results such as these is how people can be made more
cope sensitive (i.e., more linear in their valuations).
.5. Ways to increase scope sensitivity
Suggestions to increase scope sensitivity may  be based on
mproving decision makers’ affective responses as well as engaging
ppropriate deliberative responses. Note that affective responses
nd deliberation should not be seen as completely separate mental
rocesses for this purpose, as increased deliberation can also lead
o stronger affective responses and vice versa. Although prosocial
motions are bounded (i.e., one cannot feel limitless compassion;
atson, 1990; Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983), it
s possible to raise emotional concern for victims of large-scale
atastrophes by vivid descriptions of affected single individuals.
Fig. 6. Subjective preference (choices) aFig. 7. Preferences for lifesaving projects.
Narratives, personal stories of victims, and visual images generally
motivate helping responses more than using abstract numerical
ﬁgures. When faced with large numbers that are difﬁcult to men-
tally represent, people may  sometimes imagine a representative
and more vivid prototype that keeps their emotions engaged
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). While some evidence exists that
affect-rich stimuli tend to decrease scope sensitivity (Hsee &
Rottenstreich, 2004; but see Gong & Baron, 2011), in the context of
lifesaving it might be useful to enhance affective processing. Emo-
tions based on moral intuitions can be a good guide in valuations
when only few lives are at risk, and if these intuitions do not scale
up well other steps need to be taken to keep emotions aroused
when many lives are at risk (Slovic et al., 2013).
Other attempts to increase scope sensitivity are based on more
careful deliberation and reﬂection. This should especially be the
case for public policy decisions that are complex and deal with
multiple conﬂicting objectives besides lifesaving. Perhaps the most
direct way of counteracting scope insensitivity could be to increase
individual and public awareness of its existence and inﬂuence on
decisions. However, it is likely that merely informing people about
the negative effects of intuitive valuations on giving is not sufﬁcient.
Small et al. (2007) found that debiasing participants by inform-
ing about the identiﬁed victim effect actually decreased donations
to the identiﬁed victim rather than increase donations toward
unidentiﬁed statistical victims. Another way to engage deliberative
nd judged allocations (by NGOs).
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rocesses would be to make the numbers of lives at risk more evalu-
ble (Slovic et al., 2013). This could include presenting comparative
tatistics of victim numbers as well as the predicted impact of a
umanitarian aid intervention. Statistics can be brought to life by
aking them more descriptive, splitting number of victims into
omen, children, elderly, victims of assault, etc. A more indirect
ay to increase scope sensitivity is based on the fact that people
ike to be consistent in their evaluations (Ariely, Loewenstein, &
relec, 2003), which can lead to a more deliberative approach to
aluations by means of calculations. For example, Hsee, Zhang, Lu,
nd Xu (2013) propose that initial scope insensitivity can be turned
nto scope consistency by ﬁrst asking about valuations of a single
ife and then about valuations of multiple lives. Providing a valua-
ion for one life can lead people to realize that their valuation for N
ives is not linear and correct for this by increasing their valuations.
nother recent approach found that while people are insensitive
o the number of lives at risk, they may  not be as insensitive to
he number of fatalities that have already occurred (Evangelidis &
an den Bergh, 2013). This could imply that the number of fatalities
nforms decision makers about the severity of the humanitarian aid
risis more than the number of lives at risk does.
At the decision-making level of government agencies and NGOs,
ther institutional changes and rational organizational structures
ay  also increase scope sensitivity and help to avoid falling prey to
he limits of moral intuitions when many lives are in danger. Public
olicy is more than a simple reaction toward issues related to risks.
sually government agencies and NGOs have to choose between
any different courses of action and evaluate different tradeoffs,
ll of which should be done reﬂectively. For example, organizations
an make use of cost-beneﬁt analyses or implement a threshold
odel which automatically triggers action when a speciﬁc num-
er of lives are at risk (Slovic et al., 2013). It is not always clear,
owever, how costs and beneﬁts should be measured, calculated
nd weighted in decisions. Possible costs include money, time, the
ives of rescue workers, international political consequences, and
ther negative implications of (in)actions. Beneﬁts include (among
thers) the improvement in nutrition, health and safety, and gen-
ral standard of living.6 If valuations of these dimensions are done
d hoc and intuitively, they may  be inconsistent and biased (e.g.,
ahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Requiring ofﬁcials to give rea-
ons for inaction as well as action in the face of humanitarian crises
ould encourage a more reﬂective approach to public policy and
ould reduce these inconsistencies. Decision analysis and using a
onsequence matrix for clarifying the intervention tradeoffs could
lso be a useful tool to reach this goal (Slovic, Västfjäll, & Gregory,
012). However, calibrating the right level of aid responses is a
articular challenge for public policy. Some evidence exists that
lthough knowledge and commitment to problems within a par-
icular domain can reduce biases in valuations, it may  not increase
cope sensitivity (Markowitz, Slovic, Västfjäll, & Hodges, 2013).
A decision strategy that can potentially help organizations avoid
n inefﬁcient allocation of funds for charitable projects would be to
se the average impact (i.e., beneﬁt) as well as the marginal beneﬁt
f each additional dollar invested (Baron & Szymanska, 2011). If the
oal is to help as many people as possible (or increase welfare to the
aximum extent), the valuation of lives can be captured as a util-
ty maximizing problem within the framework of most forms of
tilitarianism. According to this perspective, to assure that funds
re used in the best possible way organizations should use them
o maximize the welfare of all people affected. Humanitarian aid
rojects that help more people at the same or lower cost of less
6 The tradeoff between costs and beneﬁts obviously includes many more dimen-
ions. For example, age, income, and nationality may  also be considered when
eciding how to allocate funding to people in need (e.g., Li et al., 2010).emory and Cognition 4 (2015) 248–255 253
efﬁcient projects should therefore be preferred because they have
a higher average impact. Conversely, the idea of using the marginal
beneﬁt per additional dollar invested is based on the observa-
tion that charitable organizations and projects have speciﬁc target
funding levels, at which the available funds are used optimally.
Additional funding might do more good in projects or organizations
that have not reached this optimal level.
2. Concluding remarks
In this article, we  presented four different ways to value the
lives of others and argued that intuitive valuations can lead to scope
insensitivity, which represents a deviation from normative valua-
tions. An important assumption in this depiction of valuations is
that they underlie and guide decisions regarding the welfare of
others. It is possible, of course, that valuations of life are not always
reﬂected in the amount of help (i.e., money, food, medicine, educa-
tion, etc.) given to people in need. Moreover, an implicit assumption
in most research on the effects of victim numbers on donations is
that the effectiveness of an additional dollar spent remains con-
stant regardless of the total number of people in need. It is likely
that this is not always the case. For example, if funding is used to
build a well to provide clean water, the effectiveness of the spend-
ing depends on how many people beneﬁt from it. Also, certain costs
remain fairly constant regardless of the amount of people in need
(e.g., the transportation costs of food for one or one-hundred peo-
ple). In order to efﬁciently allocate resources, charity organizations
and institutions need to consider these ﬁxed costs in their calcu-
lations of how much a life is worth to them. Indeed, the valuation
of lives is only one consideration in responses to risk (Fischhoff,
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1981). Some evidence exists
that people tend to evaluate programs to save human lives by their
cost-effectiveness (e.g., the number of lives saved per money unit),
but only if this dimension is easy to evaluate (Caviola, Faulmüller,
Everett, Savulescu, & Kahane, 2014).
When only looking at the numbers of affected people, it is difﬁ-
cult to understand why some humanitarian catastrophes generate a
greater aid response than others. For example, in 2010 the human-
itarian aid response in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti
(which affected an estimated 3 million people) was more than
3 billion dollars. In the same year, the ﬂood in Pakistan (which
affected an estimated 20 million people) received only 2.2 billion
dollars (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013). The valuation of a
single life was  10 times higher in Haiti than in Pakistan. It is, of
course, possible that aid in Pakistan was  more available and more
efﬁcient in helping affected people than in Haiti, which cautions
against using only the volume of ﬁnancial contributions as a proxy
for valuations.
Perhaps like few other decision making domains, the valuation
of lives is inherently intertwined with issues of morality, norma-
tivity and rationality. These valuations are often guided by moral
intuitions which are, in turn, inﬂuenced more by emotions rather
than rational considerations (Haidt, 2007). In the speciﬁc case of
valuations underlying public policy decisions, one would expect
that each individual life at risk should be given the same con-
sideration and value, which is a moral principle to which most
individuals in western countries would probably agree to. Nonethe-
less, intuitive tradeoffs and the limits of moral intuitions underlying
scope insensitivity in lifesaving contexts can often lead to non-
normative and irrational valuations (Reyna & Casillas, 2009). We
would also like to point out that deviations from normative models
can present a particular problem for public policy when it has to jus-
tify the reasons for allocation decisions to the public. It is not always
clear which normative standards should guide decisions, though.
For example, it is possible to argue for proportion dominance to
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epresent a form of normative valuation when the goal is to save
n entire group. From this perspective, it makes sense to maximize
roportions when otherwise the existence of the threatened group
s on the line.
Future research should aim at generating a better understand-
ng of the reasons and mechanisms of scope insensitivity and ways
o reduce it. The search for scope sensitivity could look at how
radeoffs between lives and money are done in complex public pol-
cy decisions regarding the welfare of others. One interesting way
orward would be to model the affective and cognitive processes
nderlying such valuations. Given the link to perceptual theories
onﬂict of interest
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
ppendix A. Materials
nstructions:
Please imagine that you work for a charity organization and are
esponsible for distributing donations in a village in Africa in which
00 people live that face a severe food shortage. You have up to 5000
uros available but do not exactly know how many of the 100 peo-
le are affected and need help. Three programs to combat the food
hortage are available (Program A–C). They differ in the amount
f money distributed depending on how many people are at risk
f starvation. Your task is to choose one of these programs. Each
f them will alleviate the hunger of the affected people (although
ot necessarily to the same extent) and costs different amounts of
oney, depending on the number of people in need of help.
and already existing evidence of attention as an important driver
of valuations (e.g., Dickert & Slovic, 2009), process models could
improve our understanding on how and when valuations deviate
from normative expectations. Future research might also examine
the extent to which experts (i.e., public policy makers) can pro-
tect themselves against intuitive valuations of human lives. Scope
insensitivity presents a unique challenge for public policy and man-
agers of government and non-government organizations. It is our
hope that research will provide some answers to guide public pol-
icy decisions and reduce scope insensitivity in this important risk
domain.
Program A (Fig. 1):
Here donations will be distributed in a way such that the amount
increases at a constant rate the more needy persons exist.
Program B (Fig. 3):
Here donations will be distributed in a way such that the amount
increases the more needy persons exist, but at a decreasing rate.
Program C (Fig. 4):
Here donations will be distributed in a way such that the amount
is high if only few needy persons exist but decreases overall if the
number of needy persons increases.
Please indicate how much you agree to each of these
statements:
Do not
agree
Agree very
much
1. Donations should generally be
distributed according to Program A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2.  Donations should generally be
distributed according to Program B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3.  Donations should generally be
distributed according to Program C
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
If you had to choose one of these projects, which one would you choose?
O Program A O Program B O Program C
In  your opinion, which of these Programs describes actual allocation of donations by NGOs in the above situation best?
O  Program A O Program B O Program Ceferences
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